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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-1414 
__________ 
 
JAMES RIFFIN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-17-cv-05685) 
District Judge:  Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 3, 2019 
Before:  KRAUSE, SCIRICA, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed July 15, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se Appellant James Riffin appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing 
his complaint for lack of standing.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  Riffin filed his complaint in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in December 2017.  The complaint raised federal claims, 
see generally 49 U.S.C. §§ 10903, 11704(b), against Consolidated Rail (“Conrail”), a 
Pennsylvania corporation.  The claims stemmed from a dispute over Conrail’s sale of a 
historic rail property to eight developers (the “LLCs”).  See generally City of Jersey City 
v. Consol. Rail Corp., 668 F.3d 741, 742–44 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  Riffin did not allege that 
he was affiliated with the LLCs or involved with the sale. 
The sale has resulted in protracted litigation among various parties, in different 
forums, for over a decade.  Id.  The litigation includes claims that the LLCs brought 
against their title insurer (“Chicago Title”) and claims that Chicago Title brought against 
Conrail.  See generally 212 Marin Boulevard, LLC v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., No. A-0774-
17T2, 2019 WL 287215, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 23, 2019).  Riffin alleged 
that the LLCs and Chicago Title reached a settlement in which, among other things, 
Chicago Title agreed to pay $5 million to the LLCs.  Riffin claimed that Chicago Title 
also agreed to assign certain rights, including its subrogation claims against Conrail, to 
the LLCs.  Riffin maintained that the LLCs later assigned those rights to him.  The claims 
in his complaint are premised solely on the assignment of those rights. 
Conrail filed a motion to dismiss.  The District Court granted the motion, 
determining that Riffin lacked standing.  This appeal ensued. 
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary review over a 
District Court’s decision to dismiss for lack of standing.”  Am. Orthopedic & Sports 
Med. v. Indep. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 890 F.3d 445, 449 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation 
omitted).  When a party contests the sufficiency of the pleadings to establish standing, we 
“consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and we do so 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).  
As with motions to dismiss, generally, we may also consider matters of public record.  
See Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014).  We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s choice-of-law analysis.  Specialty Surfaces Int’l, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. 
Co., 609 F.3d 223, 229 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. 
Article III of the Constitution limits the power of the federal judiciary to the 
resolution of cases and controversies.  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.  “That case-or-controversy 
requirement is satisfied only where a plaintiff has standing.”  Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. 
v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273 (2008).  To establish Article III standing, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) . . . an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the 
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
judicial decision.”  Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 874 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). 
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Here, Riffin alleged that he had standing based on the purported assignment of the 
LLCs’ rights (acquired from Chicago Title) to bring certain claims against Conrail.  
Because we conclude that the assignment to Riffin is invalid, he lacks standing.  See Am. 
Orthopedic & Sports Med., 890 F.3d at 455 (plaintiff asserting rights pursuant to invalid 
assignment lacked standing); Kenrich Corp. v. Miller, 377 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1967) 
(applying Pennsylvania’s champerty doctrine and affirming dismissal for lack of standing 
based on champertous assignment).1  
Under Pennsylvania’s champerty doctrine, “an arrangement offends public policy 
against champerty and is illegal if it provides for the institution of litigation by and at the 
expense of a person who, but for that agreement, has no interest in it, with the 
understanding that his reward is to be a share of whatever proceeds the litigation may 
yield.”  Kenrich Corp, 377 F.2d at 314.  “[T]he common law doctrine of champerty 
remains a viable defense in Pennsylvania,” and, “if an assignment is champertous, it is 
invalid.”  Frank v. TeWinkle, 45 A.3d 434, 438 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).  “An assignment is 
champertous when the party involved: (1) has no legitimate interest in the suit, but for the 
agreement; (2) expends his own money in prosecuting the suit; and (3) is entitled by the 
bargain to share in the proceeds of the suit.”  Id. at 438–39. 
Here, Riffin’s agreement with the LLCs, which was referenced in Riffin’s 
complaint and is contained in the record, satisfies each of these elements.  First, but for 
                                              
1 The invalidity of the assignment here, without more, is sufficient to conclude that Riffin 
lacks standing.  Thus, we need not consider Conrail’s remaining arguments that he lacks 
standing. 
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the agreement, Riffin did not allege that he has any personal interest in his claims, which 
stem from a dispute between the LLCs, Chicago Title, and Conrail.  Second, the 
agreement provides that the LLCs shall incur no expenses from Riffin’s prosecution of 
the claims.  Thus, Riffin “is using his own money to finance the suit[], as he is the pro se 
plaintiff and is therefore responsible for filing fees and other associated costs.”  Frank, 45 
A.3d at 439.  And third, the agreement provides that Riffin is entitled to a percentage of 
any proceeds from the claims.  Thus, the assignment to Riffin is champertous, and 
therefore invalid, under Pennsylvania law. 
But our discussion cannot end there because, as the parties agree, New Jersey law 
does not prohibit champerty.  See Sweeney v. Veneziano, 175 A.2d 241, 245 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1961).  Riffin argues that the District Court should have applied New 
Jersey law to determine whether the assignment was valid, whereas Conrail maintains 
that the District Court correctly applied Pennsylvania law.  To resolve this issue, we 
“apply Pennsylvania's choice-of-law principles as the [district] court was in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.”  Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 389 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing 
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)). 
Applying Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law principles, we first conclude that there is a 
true conflict here, as both jurisdictions’ interests would be at least somewhat “impaired 
by the application of the other’s laws.”  Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 220, 230 
(3d Cir. 2007).  Thus, we proceed to ask which state has the “greater interest in the 
application of its law.”  Id. at 231 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  “This analysis 
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requires more than a mere counting of contacts.  Rather, we must weigh the contacts on a 
qualitative scale according to their relation to the policies and interests underlying the 
[particular] issue.”  Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted, alteration in original). 
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Pennsylvania has the greater 
interest in the application of its law here.  While there are some contacts with both states,2 
Pennsylvania’s interests in applying its champerty doctrine to claims against a 
Pennsylvania corporation prevail.  As this Court has recognized, a champertous 
assignment “offends public policy . . . and is illegal” under Pennsylvania law.  Kenrich 
Corp, 377 F.2d at 314; see also McIlvaine Trucking, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (States), 810 A.2d 
1280, 1286 (Pa. 2002) (resolving contractual choice-of-law dispute in favor of applying 
Pennsylvania law, and emphasizing that “agreements may be avoided where, as here, 
their terms offend [Pennsylvania] public policy”).  In contrast, Riffin has cited no 
authority to support his argument that New Jersey has a strong interest in the enforcement 
of such assignments; rather, New Jersey courts have merely held that the defense of 
champerty “does not apply in this State.”  Sweeney, 175 A.2d at 245. 
                                              
2 In particular, we note that Conrail is a Pennsylvania corporation and that the dispute 
stems, in part, from the sale of a property in New Jersey.  We also note that Riffin alleged 
that he was domiciled in Maryland, that the LLCs’ were managed by a New York 
resident who purportedly assigned the LLCs’ rights to Riffin, and that the assignment was 
made in Maryland (though Riffin alleges that the assignment was negotiated in New 
Jersey).  While neither party presses an argument that New York or Maryland law 
applies, see Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (“parties 
may waive choice-of-law issues”), we note that those jurisdictions recognize the defense 
of champerty.  See Justinian Capital SPC v. WestLB AG, N.Y. Branch, 65 N.E.3d 1253, 
1254 (N.Y. 2016); Accrued Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Prime Retail, Inc., 298 F.3d 291, 300 (4th 
Cir. 2002). 
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Because Pennsylvania law applies, the purported assignment to Riffin is 
champertous, and, therefore, it is invalid.  Thus, Riffin lacked standing to bring his claims 
here.  See Am. Orthopedic & Sports Med., 890 F.3d at 455. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  In doing so, we 
hold only that the purported assignment is invalid for purposes of Riffin’s standing to 
bring his claims here, and we express no opinion on the validity of the assignment for any 
other purposes.3 
                                              
3 Riffin’s motion for an extension of time to file his reply brief is denied as unnecessary.  
The Clerk verbally granted his request to file his reply brief no later than June 11, 2019, 
and his reply brief filed on June 10, 2019, is timely.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 31.4. 
